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ABSTRACT 
 
This study explores how organizational learning and host country government corruption 
influenced outward foreign direct investment by Korean textile firms between 1986 and 1995, 
given that foreign direct investment decisions are not made in isolation from these two factors. 
The results provide empirical evidence for the recent organizational learning theory argument 
that the longevity of country-specific experience has a curvilinear relationship with foreign direct 
investment. In addition, the results suggest that the positive relationship between host country 
government corruption and foreign direct investment is moderated by the decreasing effect of host 
country–specific experience over time, suggesting that a dynamic framework of organizational 
learning could be used to cautiously qualify the existing bifurcated positive versus negative 
conclusion about the government corruption–foreign direct investment relationship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
oreign direct investment (FDI) decisions cannot be made in isolation from organizational experience 
and host country government corruption. To examine this issue, one stream of research has explored 
the relationship between organizational experience and international expansion (Barkema, Bell, & 
Pennings, 1996; Chang, 1995; Shaver, Mitchell, & Yeung, 1997; Yu, 1990). Another stream of research has focused 
on the relationship between government corruption and FDI (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, 
Colins, & Eden, 2003; Meschi, 2009; Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006; Wei, 2000). Although the two 
perspectives can be complementary in a dynamic framework of organizational learning, they have been 
independently employed to understand FDI activities. How does organizational experience affect FDI? How is host 
country government corruption associated with FDI by foreign investors? Does organizational experience moderate 
the relationship between government corruption and FDI over time? This study sets out to answer these questions. 
 
A multi-national enterprise (MNE) generally develops new capabilities through its experience in foreign 
markets (Kogut, 1983). New knowledge and capabilities gained from county-specific experience influence 
international expansion strategy (Barkema et al., 1996; Delios & Beamish, 2001; Pennings, Barkema, & Douma, 
1994). Local firms have the advantage over foreign firms in their understanding of host market cultural, political, 
and economic institutions, but foreign firms can overcome these competitive disadvantages as they accumulate 
capabilities through ongoing investments in a given foreign market over time (Barkema et al., 1996; Chang, 1995; 
Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Accumulated general operations experience across countries may also determine the 
international expansion of MNEs (Yu, 1990). 
 
In terms of the FDI–experience relationship, most existing studies have supported a linear relationship 
(Buckley & Casson, 1981; Chang, 1995; Luo & Peng, 1999; Yu, 1991), giving little attention to the non-linear 
F 
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relationship (Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988; Luo & Peng, 1999; Shaver et al., 1997). The effect of 
experience may decrease over time because of saturated competition, additional transaction costs, and increased 
production costs in a given host country (Meschi, 2009; Teece, 1986; Zhao, Kim, & Du, 2003). Accordingly, this 
study explores whether outward FDI has a curvilinear relationship with accumulated country-specific experience in 
a given host country over time. 
 
Government corruption varies across countries (Smarzynska & Wei, 2000), and it forms a general rule of 
the game in a given country. Hence, it is necessary for foreign investors to cope with corruption in a new 
environment. Rodriguez et al. (2005) contend that understanding the different natures of government corruption may 
be fundamental to international expansion strategy and operations. The international business (IB) literature still 
lacks empirical evidence of the effect of government corruption on FDI activities; if anything, it rests on anecdotal 
evidence (Zhao et al., 2003). Moreover, existing empirical studies about the relationship between government 
corruption and FDI have been bifurcated: positive (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005; Boddewyn, 1988; Rodriguez, 
Uhlensruck, & Eden, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) versus negative (Aidt, 2003; Heineman & Heimann, 2006; 
Jain, 2001; Meschi, 2009; O’Higgins, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Wei, 2000). 
 
This study does not explore such a mechanical bifurcated relationship. By borrowing the underlying 
reasoning of the dynamic organizational learning process, this study rather investigates how the relationship changes 
over time as a firm accumulates country-specific experience. We postulate that in the initial stage, foreign investors 
are likely to increase outward FDI in order to take advantage of new opportunities caused by government corruption, 
as the functionalist view contends (Boddewyn, 1988; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). However, in the later stage, the 
positive relationship between FDI and government corruption will be moderated by the decreasing effect of host 
country–specific experience. 
 
This study differs from the existing research on the effects of organizational learning and government 
corruption on FDI. To understand Korean textile firms’ FDI activities, first, this study focuses on the dynamic 
process of organizational learning rather than the static linear perspective on the relationship between FDI and 
experience, suggesting a quadratic effect of experience on FDI. This study puts forward the complementary 
relationship between organizational learning and government corruption in understanding outward FDI activities, 
investigating how the relationship between outward FDI and host country government corruption is moderated by 
country-specific experience over time. We test the primary questions using a sample of 1,197 subsidiary-by-year 
cases involving Korean textile firms across 46 countries between 1986 and 1995. 
 
The immediately following section reviews existing studies of organizational learning and government 
corruption and then develops the testable primary hypotheses. Thereafter, we introduce sample data and our research 
method. We then discuss our results and implications and suggest possible future research directions in light of the 
likely constraints. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Experience and FDI 
 
Organizational learning can be defined as codified routines from history (Levitt & March, 1988). Learning 
by doing is a representative source of organizational learning (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The main tenet of 
organizational learning theory is that an organization learns from its past experience (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Cyert & March, 1963). How experience influences FDI has been one of the most debated questions. With respect to 
the role of experiential learning in the FDI context, Yu (1990) notes that country-specific and general experience 
significantly influence inward and outward FDI activities. 
 
Country-specific experience is generally associated with the longevity of exposure in a given market 
(Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997; Delios & Beamish, 2001; Meschi, 2009). Firms with a longer presence in a given 
country are likely to have a competitive advantage over new entrants in terms of access to local resources and 
markets, corporate and product image (Mitchell, Shaver, & Yeung, 1992), connections with the business community 
and government authorities (Luo & Peng, 1999), and capability to reduce uncertainty in the operational and financial 
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environments (Luo, 1998). New knowledge and capabilities gained from a firm’s county-specific operational 
experience influence its international expansion strategy and subsequent performance (Barkema et al., 1996; Delios 
& Beamish, 2001; Pennings et al., 1994). 
 
A number of previous studies have also identified that general experience, such as international operations 
experience (Yu, 1990) and regional experience (Benito & Gripsrud, 1992), can be easily transferred into other host 
countries and in turn influence the international expansion of MNEs. General organizational experience across 
countries is a critical predictor of multinational expansion (Luo & Peng, 1999). 
 
Government Corruption and FDI 
 
Institutional environments set the rules of the game for standard economic activities within a given country 
(North, 1990; Rodriguez et al., 2005). Government corruption represents a fundamental institutional dimension 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), and it can be defined as abuse or misuse of government authority for private purposes 
(Meschi, 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Government corruption has diverse causes such as 
state intervention in an economy, governmental discretionary power and monopoly (Alam, 1990), civil servant 
intermediation costs (Mookherjee & Png, 1995), explicit payment of tips and speed money, and implicit favor 
exchanges and commissions (Zhao et al., 2003). In a country with a high level of corruption, foreign firms tend to 
pay bribes to government officials in order to gain favorable conditions for permits, licenses, loans, or other 
government services (Wei, 1997). Since corruption is often considered a social evil and it hinders standard economic 
activities, OECD countries have attempted to root out corruption to create a better business environment (Zhao et al., 
2003). 
 
Nonetheless, government corruption is an ongoing institutional problem across countries. It is becoming 
increasingly important to understand the institutional environment because an international expansion strategy 
cannot be determined in isolation from the host country’s institutional environment. The linkage between 
government corruption and FDI activities has been a fundamental issue among policymakers and practitioners 
(Heineman & Heimann, 2006; Henisz, 2000). In connecting government corruption with FDI activities, Mauro 
(1995) and Tolluock (1996) argue that government corruption is closely related to performance (Mauro, 1995). 
Existing studies have argued that the relationship between government corruption and FDI may be either positive 
(Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005; Boddewyn, 1988; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) or negative 
(Aidt, 2003; Heineman & Heimann, 2006; Jain, 2001; Meschi, 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2005). These bifurcated 
empirical findings have increased confusion rather than contributing to theoretical and empirical implications. By 
applying the dynamic process of organizational learning, this study carefully qualifies the established bifurcated 
corruption–FDI relationship. 
 
Government Corruption in Korea, 1986–1995 (Fifth and Sixth Republic Government Periods) 
 
According to the 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), South Korea scored 55 out of 100 and came in 
27
th
 among the 34 countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
suggesting that South Korea was one of the highly corrupted countries during the fifth and sixth Republic 
government periods. Corporations have combatted corruption since Korea’s transition from a long-time military 
dictatorship to democracy in 1987. However, the transition period between 1986 and 1995 saw a high level of 
government corruption and the economy faced a number of corporate corruption cases. Large corporations such as 
conglomerates and chaebols, for example, have been involved in tax evasion and corruption (Kim, 2009). 
Corruption still creates problems for companies in South Korea, including excessive bureaucracy, weak corporate 
governance, misapplication and abuse of laws and regulations, and non-transparent regulatory processes (Business 
Anti-Corruption Portal, 2013). 
 
From the survey to understand the most corrupt groups of people in Korea, Kim (2009) found that 
politicians (70.6 percent) are the most corrupt group, with civil servants (12.2 percent) and many others following 
such that the bureaucratic corruption in South Korea has reached the level of a national crisis. Kim (2009) also noted 
that in the Fifth and Sixth Republic periods, many bureaucrats in public institutions intentionally misused and 
abused public funds for their own interests rather than the public interest. During these transition periods, slush fund 
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scandals with chaebols, large companies, and politicians were common, worsening the government corruption 
problem. For example, two former presidents appeared in court as defendants in 1993: Chun Doo-hwan and Roh 
Tae-woo, representing the Fifth and Sixth Republic periods, respectively. In the first trial, the former was sentenced 
to death and fined in connection with the amassing of a 220 billion won
i
 slush fund, and in the second, the latter 
was sentenced to 22-and-a-half years in prison and fined 283.8 billion won for bribery (Kim, 2009). These cases 
represent significant sources of bureaucratic corruption and contributed to discrediting South Korea. 
 
The Fifth and Sixth Republic government periods provided an environment characterized by a high level of 
government corruption. While coping with the high level of government corruption in the domestic market during 
these two transition periods, many Korean companies accumulated general knowledge and capabilities to deal with 
government corruption. Hence, we postulate that Korean textile firms could apply their accumulated general 
knowledge when entering foreign counties with a high level of corruption. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Country-Specific Experience and FDI 
 
Country-specific experience generally occurs when a firm continues operations and acquires country-
specific knowledge in a foreign market over time. A firm’s international expansion may rest on the acquisition of 
tacit knowledge through learning by doing across countries (Kogut, 1991). International expansion occurs 
incrementally because a firm tends to increase its commitment and take advantage of emerging opportunities in a 
given host country (Chang, 1995). Previous studies imply that the international expansion process is a series of 
incremental commitment processes in an evolutionary context. 
 
Familiarity with a market reduces cost while increasing the possibility that a foreign firm will further serve 
that market through direct investment (Buckley & Casson, 1981). Some studies have found that MNEs’ next FDI 
decisions are positively influenced by their foreign subsidiaries’ operational experiences in a given market. Ball and 
Tschoegl (1982), for example, found that the longer presence of a bank in a given foreign country enables foreign 
investors to become more familiar with the country, making them more likely to undertake additional FDI activities. 
Hence, according to the traditional tenet of organizational learning theory, we postulate that the more experience a 
firm has in a country, the greater the possibility that it will invest further in that country. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The longevity of country-specific experience will be positively associated with the amount of 
foreign direct investment in a given host country. 
 
Government Corruption and FDI 
 
Again, political and nonmarket transactions are often essential for multinational entry and expansion when 
entering host countries with a high level of corruption (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Although recognizing that 
government corruption refers to a nonmarket constraint, many foreign investors choose to enter a host country with 
high corruption. Some view corruption as an opportunity for political behavior by MNEs (Anand et al., 2005; 
Boddewyn, 1988; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Rodriguez et al., 2005). Specifically, the functionalist view 
emphasizes the redeeming value of government corruption, suggesting that corruption has a positive effect on 
economic development (Zhao et al., 2003). This positive relationship has often been observed in Southeast Asian 
countries such as Indonesia and Thailand, most of which have been growing fast in spite of perceived high levels of 
government corruption (Tanzi, 1998). Previous studies confirm that government corruption is definitely contributing 
to economic growth. 
 
General operations experience gained from both the home country and host countries can be applicable to a 
new host country (Yu, 1990). Delios and Beamish, (2001), for example, contend that intangible assets gained from 
the home country can be applied into new geographic markets without depreciating the value of such assets, 
implying that knowledge gained from experiential learning from the home country can be transferred to host 
                                                          
i Won indicates the Korean currency unit. For readers’ understanding, 1 US dollar was changed 1,276 won in 2009. 
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counties. The acquisition and application of experiential learning depends on a firm’s “absorptive capacity” (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990). Korean textile firms developed absorptive capacity while coping with government corruption 
during the two transition periods. The accumulated firm-specific knowledge of how to deal with government 
corruption before and during the transition periods provided a competitive force to pursue international expansion 
because such tacit knowledge cannot be easily gained (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). Hence, we assume that the 
outward investment of Korean textile firms is likely to increase regardless of the high level of government 
corruption in host countries because they tend to regard government corruption as creating opportunities. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Host country government corruption will be positively associated with foreign direct investment in 
a given host country. 
 
Non-Linear Effect of Experience 
 
Most of the existing studies contend that organizational experience has a positive linear relationship with 
FDI. Contrary to the established argument, the relationship between host country experience and performance may 
be non-linear (Mitchell, Shaver, & Yeung, 1994; Shaver et al., 1997). In other words, the effect of organizational 
experience on FDI may be strong during the early stage of international expansion process because country-specific 
knowledge gained in the early stage may offset the costs of operations (Zaheer, 1995). However, the positive effect 
of experience on performance decreases in the later stage because the number of foreign firms increases in a foreign 
market, overcrowding occurs, and competition becomes much more intense over time (Luo & Peng, 1999; Mitchell 
et al., 1994; Shaver et al., 1997), reducing the likelihood of further investment by foreign firms over time. We accept 
and attempt to test this emerging argument and in turn to provide empirical evidence. Hence, we postulate that there 
is a curvilinear relationship between experience and the amount of foreign investment, given the decreasing effect of 
country-specific experience. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of country-specific experience on the amount of foreign direct investment will 
diminish as a foreign subsidiary continues operations in a host country (i.e., curvilinear 
relationship). 
 
Moderating Effect of Experience 
 
Meschi (2009) argues that “differences in country knowledge among foreign firms lead to different 
reactions to government corruptions” (p. 247), implying that an MNE may develop and accumulate distinct country-
specific capabilities and knowledge when continuing operations in a host country with a different level of 
government corruption. The functionalist perspective argues that government corruption creates favorable 
opportunities, which in turn lead to an increase in FDI by foreign investors. This perspective centers on the static 
perspective for the corruption–FDI relationship. However, as described earlier, FDI decisions are a dynamic process 
that evolves over time. That is, FDI decisions cannot be determined in isolation from organizational experience in a 
given country. Hence, the final question is to how the positive government corruption–FDI relationship in the initial 
stage evolves as an MNE continues operations in a host country. Specifically, this study cautiously examines how 
the positive corruption–FDI relationship is moderated by the country-specific experience effect, given that 
experiential learning in host countries tends to take place through coping with country-specific government 
corruption environments. Hence, we postulate that the government corruption–FDI relationship may be moderated 
by the decreasing effect of host country–specific experience in a given country such that the positive effect of 
government corruption on foreign investment observed in the early stage will decrease over time. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between government corruption and the amount of foreign direct 
investment will be moderated by the decreasing effect of host country–specific experience. 
 
METHOD AND ANALYSIS 
 
Sample 
 
This study uses a sample of 1197 subsidiary-by-year cases. Forty-six countries with different levels of 
government corruption, circa 1995, were host to Korean textile firms. Except for France, Germany, Japan, the 
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United Kingdom, and the United States, the host countries were classified as developing countries. FDI data for 
Korean firms have been recorded since 1986. Between 1986 and 1995, Korean textile firms were major contributors 
to the improvement of national employment and production (Statistics Korea, 2004). While South Korea saw 
increasing labor costs during this period, labor-intensive Korean textile firms depended on FDI to explore overseas 
opportunities. 
 
When designing research driven by longitudinal data, researchers tend to face the so-called censoring 
problem (Allison, 1984). This study set 1986 as the beginning of the observation period because, even though 
Korean textile firms engaged in FDI before 1986, there were few pre-1986 observations and, moreover, these were 
not officially documented. The year 1995 was right censored because the focus is on the early period, in which 
empirical studies are still scarce. Furthermore, there are missing and unavailable data for several years after 1995. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
As mentioned earlier, this study is primarily interested in how outward FDI by Korean textile firms is 
influenced by their experience and host country government corruption. The amount of FDI has been widely used a 
fundamental proxy for international expansion (Buckley et al., 2007; Yu, 1990). The dependent variable is the total 
amount of annual FDI by Korean textile firms in a given host country. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Country-Specific Experience 
 
The longevity of country-specific experience (EXP) was measured as the accumulated number of years that 
a certain foreign subsidiary operated in a given host country (Chang, 1995; Erramilli, 1991). Specifically, we first 
identified all subsidiaries in host countries and then calculated the accumulated number of years a foreign subsidiary 
had in a given market as a proxy for country-specific experience. The longevity of experience in our sample ranges 
from 1 to 10 years. 
 
Government Corruption 
 
Government corruption (GCOR) can be measured by aggregating all categories of corrupt transactions into 
a single index (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Three types of corruption indexes are commonly used (Meschi, 2009): The 
Economist’s Economic Intelligence Unit and Political Risk Services Group (PRS) indexes (i.e., ICRG ratings); the 
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) and World Development Report (WDR) indexes; and the Transparency 
International indexes. These indexes are measured in slightly distinct ways. This study employs PRS ratings because 
only they can be applied for the observation period of this study (i.e., between 1986 and 1995). Since 1979, PRS has 
recorded and reported 22 variables about political, financial, and economic risks for around 162 countries, circa 
2009. This study focuses only on corruption-rating scores. The original corruption score in the PRS ratings ranges 
between 0 (high level of corruption) and 6 (no corruption). To facilitate interpretation, the author recalculated the 
corruption score so that 0 means “no corruption” and 6 refers to the highest level of corruption. 
 
Control Variables 
 
This study controls for some confounding variables at the parent company and macro environment levels 
that are known to influence FDI activities. 
 
Ownership Rate 
 
At the parent company level, the ownership rate of the parent company for a foreign subsidiary indicates 
the commitment to its subsidiary. A higher level of ownership rate by a parent company means a larger commitment 
to its subsidiary (Li, 1995); therefore, a positive relationship between ownership rate and FDI is expected. 
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Geographic Gravity 
 
MNEs tend to start their foreign operations in foreign countries that are geographically, culturally, and 
economically similar to their home countries (Buckley et al., 2007; Yu, 1990). A large geographic distance between 
two countries indicates market access difficulties (Mayer & Zignago, 2011). Hence, it is expected that longer 
geographic distance will have a negative relationship with FDI. The Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) distance measures were used for bilateral distances. 
 
We also control location-specific economic environments: inflation and tariff rates. High inflation rates 
discourage market-seeking FDI because of increased uncertainty and volatility, and they generally lead foreign 
investors to a cost disadvantage through domestic currency devaluation (Buckley et al., 2007). Tariff rates represent 
trade barriers or restraints (Hennart & Park, 1994). Hence, we expect a negative relationship between outward FDI 
and host country inflation and tariff rates. 
 
Analytic Method 
 
Our sample consists of time-series unbalanced panel data (e.g., some firms in our sample are observed for 
10 years, but others for only 5 years). Fundamental to the analysis of panel data is the choice of a coefficient 
estimator: pooled ordinary least squares (pooled OLS), fixed effects (FE), or random effects (RE) (Baum, 2006; 
Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). The FE and RE OLS estimations are usually preferred to pooled OLS when dealing with 
heterogeneity across panels and time. We used the FE and RE models alternatively and then applied the Hausman 
test, a commonly recommended post-estimation test, to investigate whether the selected method is appropriate. We 
found that the FE model is appropriate. The final time-series FE regression model is: 
 
FDI = α + β1EXP + β2GCOR - β3EXP
2 
- β4 (EXP
2
) × (GCOR) + β5Controls + ε (1) 
 
where FDI = the amount of FDI by Korean textile firms in a given year, EXP = the longevity of country-specific 
experience in a given year, GCOR = the host country’s government corruption score in a given year, and Controls = 
ownership rates, geographic distance between South Korea and the host country, inflation rates, and tariff rates. 
 
RESULT 
 
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of variables and the correlations between variables. Table 
1 indicates that most variables generally have very low correlations, except for the correlation between gravity 
distance and tariff rates. We examined the severity of multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor (VIF) test. 
We found that there are no general multicollinearity problems with the data, although the VIF value is 15 for 
inflation, which is slightly high but acceptable. 
 
The hypotheses were examined using nested regression models to understand the model improvement. The 
first base model, Model 1 in Table 2, includes only control variables for subsidiary characteristics and country-
specific environments. The primary variables were added into Models 2, 3, 4, and 5 in sequence: experience effect 
in Model 2, host country corruption in Model 3, non-linear effect of experience on foreign investment in Model 4, 
and moderating effect of host country–specific experience on the relationship between government corruption and 
foreign investment in Model 5. 
 
Table 1: Basic Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 2705 905.47 2083.87 2 51000 1      
2 2705 80.27 25.20 8 100 .1416* 1     
3 2505 6.67 1.37 .21 10 -.0248 .0503* 1    
4 2705 5911.57 4940.92 955.65 18600.7 .0744* .2502* .2323* 1   
5 2505 24.32 13.16 3.49 105.36 -.1304* -.0825* -.4697* .7194* 1  
6 2705 2.82 1.94 1 10 .0819* .1054* .1475* .3466* -.3670* 1 
7 2525 2.61 1.10 0 5.92 .0608* .1107* .0059 .2088* -.1071* .0758* 
1: Investment Amount (Unit: 1,000 won), 2: Ownership Rate (%), 3: Inflation Rate (%), 4: Geographic Distance (Unit: km), 5: Tariff Rate (%), 6: 
Experience, 7: Government Corruption. *p < 0.05 
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The improvement in Wald chi-square is significant at the 1% confidence level, implying that the addition of 
main effect variables in each nested model results in significant model improvements. Therefore, the results imply 
that the covariates in the models are non-trivial for the explanation of outward FDI established by Korean textile 
firms. 
 
Of the control variables, ownership rate, a firm-specific variable, has an expected positive association with 
outward foreign investment, supporting the argument that as a parent company’s ownership rate in its subsidiary 
increases, its commitment increases (Li, 1995). The high commitment of a parent company to its foreign subsidiary 
leads to larger investment in a host country. The result in Model 1 also shows that of host country–specific 
environment measures, only tariff rates have an expected negative relationship with outward foreign investment at a 
marginally significant level, meaning that MNEs are less likely to invest in a host country with high tariff rates. 
 
With respect to our primary hypotheses, Hypothesis 1 predicted that the length of country-specific 
experience (EXP) of a foreign subsidiary would have a positive relationship with the amount of foreign investment 
in a given host country. The results strongly support Hypothesis 1 across all models. Hypothesis 2 predicted that 
host country government corruption (GCOR) would be positively associated with the amount of FDI. The results in 
Table 2 strongly support Hypothesis 2 across all models. For Hypothesis 3, which addresses one of the primary 
concerns, this study attempted to test the non-linear effect of organizational experience on FDI. The result in Model 
4 shows that the coefficient of the quadratic length of experience (i.e., EXP
2
) is negative at a marginally significant 
level, meaning that the positive effect of host country–specific experience, as measured by the length of operations 
in a given host country, declines over time. In Hypothesis 4, this study predicted that the effect of government 
corruption on foreign investment would be moderated by the decreasing effect of country-specific experience in a 
given host country (i.e., a negative interaction term (-GCOR × EXP
2
) between host country-specific experience and 
the level of government corruption). Consistent with the prediction, the coefficient for the interaction term in Model 
5 was negative at a significant level. The result in Model 5 strongly supports the argument that the positive effect of 
host country corruption on foreign investment is negatively moderated by the longevity of host country–specific 
experience for a foreign subsidiary. 
 
Table 2: Nested Time-Series Regression Model (Dep. Variable: Foreign Investment Amount) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant 35.8737 
(237.01) 
-356.6103 
(240.30) 
-600.2418 
(263.1757) 
-740.8901*** 
(275.4791) 
-831.7907*** 
(278.8031) 
Ownership Rate 10.14*** 
(1.6781) 
9.6906*** 
(1.6523) 
9.6517*** 
(1.6691) 
9.5073*** 
(1.6683) 
9.6746*** 
(1.6664) 
Inflation -4.2565 
(24.5228) 
18.2776 
(24.3072) 
20.5025 
(24.4169) 
29.5752 
(24.9699) 
31.9795 
(24.9785) 
Geographic Distance .0176 
(.0146) 
.0054 
(.0144) 
.0050 
(.0152) 
.0045 
(.0151) 
.0058 
(.0151) 
Tariff Rate -7.2001* 
(3.9060) 
-2.6063 
(3.9033) 
-.2661 
(4.1561) 
.3063 
(4.1632) 
.7937 
(4.1611) 
Host Country Experience 
 
90.2104*** 
(13.5483) 
98.4792*** 
(14.7868) 
163.7790*** 
(40.9464) 
186.0332*** 
(42.4110) 
Host Country Corruption 
  
61.6917** 
(30.0102) 
60.7421** 
(29.9900) 
70.0446** 
(30.3271) 
Host Country Experience2 
   
-8.1969* 
(4.7947) 
-3.5369 
(1.5227) 
(Host Country Experience2) 
× 
(Host Country Corruption) 
    
-3.0336** 
(1.5227) 
R-square .0653 .0871 .0847 .0878 .0943 
Wald Chi-square 58.72*** 105.09*** 102.56*** 105.68*** 109.97*** 
No. of Obs. 1197 1197 1172 1172 1172 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study applied the organizational learning theory and government corruption in order to understand and 
carefully qualify outward FDI by Korean textile firms between 1986 and 1995. This study set out with two primary 
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research purposes to fill the gap of the existing IB research. First, this study investigated whether FDI has a non-
linear relationship with host country–specific experience, given that organizational learning occurs through an 
evolutionary dynamic process. Hence, this study specifically explored whether the effect of experience on foreign 
investment diminishes over time as an MNE accumulates host country–specific experience in a given market. 
Second, this study questioned the existing bifurcated negative versus positive conclusion about the effect of 
government corruption on FDI, assuming that existing studies ignored the complementary relationship with the 
dynamic process of organizational learning. Accordingly, this study investigated whether the effect of government 
corruption on FDI is moderated by the decreasing effect of the longevity of country-specific experience. 
 
First, the results across all models strongly support the positive effect of country-specific experience on 
foreign investment, as expected in Hypothesis 1. This result definitely provides evidence for the main tenet of the 
Uppsala school’s international expansion process. Hence, this study suggests that MNEs benefit from their host 
country-specific experience, and that they are likely to increase foreign investment in order to take advantage of 
experiential learning in a host country. 
 
However, the results from a careful further analysis show that the coefficient of quadratic host country–
specific experience, as expected in Hypothesis 3, is negatively associated with the amount of foreign investment in a 
given foreign market, meaning that the effect of experience definitely declines over time. This finding provides 
evidence for the argument that a firm’s capabilities are continually changing and are developed through ongoing 
investment activities (Delios & Beamish, 2001). 
 
The results from Hypotheses 1 and 3 provide a theoretical contribution. This study identified two stages in 
which a firm’s capabilities are shaped by its continuing investment experience in a given host country. FDI activities 
in the early stage are positively influenced by a firm’s knowledge accumulated through ongoing operations in a 
given country. Accordingly, these results support the notion that a country-specific experience allows a firm to 
increase its familiarity with a host country, allowing a firm to reduce its associated liability of foreignness, in turn 
contributing to the economic development of the host country (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997). 
 
This study, however, carefully qualifies this argument when considering the dynamic process of 
organizational learning, and then it confirms that a firm’s capabilities evolve over time. The findings provide 
evidence for the theoretical argument that country-specific experience has a curvilinear relationship with FDI 
(Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988; Luo & Peng, 1999; Shaver et al., 1997). The findings suggest that 
the established simple linear assumption for the effect of experience on FDI should be carefully re-examined. 
 
Given that the effect of host country–specific experience on FDI is not sustainable (i.e., non-linear), this 
study can provide practical implications. MNEs should implement different FDI strategies over time. In the early 
stage, they may focus on exploiting the benefiting effect of host country–specific experience. In the later stage, 
however, firms should pay more attention to exploring other strategic options, given that they cannot leverage 
continuously such country-specific experience. The findings suggest that the sustainability of MNEs in a host 
market may be determined by the development of dynamic capabilities through ambidexterity (i.e., the combination 
of exploitation of current capabilities and exploration of new capabilities) (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). An 
additional analysis
ii
 found that foreign subsidiaries of Korean textile firms face a high hazard rate at the end of five 
years, the so-called liability of adolescence, rather than at either the early or the later stage. This additional finding 
also justifies the adoption of a different, sequential FDI strategy years after entering a host country. 
 
In terms of the effect of government corruption on FDI, most existing studies have argued that the effect is 
either positive (Anand et al., 2005; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Boddewyn, 1988) or negative 
(Aidt, 2003; Heineman & Heimann, 2006; Jain, 2001; Luo, 2004; Meschi, 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2005). The results 
in Models 3, 4, and 5 strongly support the positive argument, as expected in Hypothesis 2, providing empirical 
evidence for the argument of the functionalist view, which emphasizes the redeeming value of government 
corruption in that it creates opportunity (Boddewyn, 1988; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Rodriguez et al., 2005). The 
positive effect may also come from general operations experience gained from the home country that can be easily 
                                                          
ii The output was not reported here because it is not our primary concern, but it will be provided on demand. 
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applied to host countries (Yu, 1990). That is, Korean firms accumulated general knowledge while coping with 
government corruption in the home country during the two transition periods, and they are already equipped with the 
absorptive capacity to respond to and deal with prospective government corruption in host countries. Hence, Korean 
textile firms equipped with such absorptive capacity are likely to increase their amount of foreign investment in host 
countries with a high level of corruption because they regard government corruption as providing opportunities 
rather than being an environmental constraint. 
 
However, this study assumed that the relationship between government corruption and FDI activities would 
be more complex than most prior empirical studies have concluded. The results in Model 5 show that the positive 
relationship between government corruption and FDI is definitely moderated by the decreasing effect of host 
country–specific experience in a given market, as predicted in Hypothesis 4. This result implies that the simple 
bifurcated corruption–FDI relationship should be cautiously interpreted, given that the corruption-driven opportunity 
at the early stage can be offset over time when considering the decreasing effect of country-specific experience (i.e., 
the dynamic framework of organizational learning). In addition, the results suggest that the moderating effect may 
vary across host countries because the extent to which host country–specific experience diminishes differs according 
to the level of government corruption in host counties. 
 
To enhance our understanding in Model 5, we introduce two firms operating in different host countries with 
contrasting corruption scores and then compare how the moderating effect of country-specific experience varies 
between two countries: one operating in a host country with the highest PRS score (6), which indicates a “highly 
corrupt country,” and the other in a host country with a low PRS score (1) which indicates a “relatively transparent 
country.” The negative sign in the interaction term in Model 5 means that the positive government corruption–FDI 
relationship declines as a firm accumulates operational experience in a host country. 
 
To simplify, let us take only an interaction term from Equation 1: 
 
FDI = -3.0336 (Government Corruption) × (Experience
2
). 
 
Let us assume that the longevity of experience increases from five years to six years; firm A has operations 
in a host country with lower levels of corruption, and firm B has operations in a counterpart country with higher 
levels of corruption. 
 
According to Model 5, the interaction terms of A and B definitely have negative slopes, suggesting that the 
longevity of experience does moderate the main effect of government corruption on FDI in both firms. The amount 
of foreign investment of firm A declines by about 43% (i.e., from -76,000 won in year 5 to -109,000 won in year 6) 
with one year of experience in a host country with a low level of corruption, while the amount of foreign investment 
of firm B declines by about 44% (i.e., from -455,000 won in year 5 to -655,000 won in year 6) with one year of 
experience in a counterpart country. These specific findings are interesting in two ways. The absolute reduced 
amount of foreign investment is definitely larger in a country with a higher level of corruption than in an antithetic 
country, but the ratio of reduction is almost equal. These findings suggest that the decreasing effect of accumulated 
country-specific experience strongly offsets the positive effect of government corruption on foreign investment over 
time, regardless of the level of host country corruption. 
 
These findings provide a new perspective on the corruption–FDI relationship. The existing literature has 
paid more attention to the simple binary effect of government corruption. When incorporating a dynamic framework 
of organizational learning into the model, however, the established bifurcated effect of government corruption on 
FDI is no longer supported, suggesting that government corruption does not independently influence FDI. Hence, 
the relationship should be cautiously interpreted in the literature. These findings also provide practical implications. 
Given that the non-linear corruption–FDI relationship varies according to the level of corruption, managers may 
implement different FDI strategies over time when entering host countries with different levels of government 
corruption. 
 
Like other studies, this study has some limitations. First, the sample data may not represent the whole 
population because foreign investments increased sharply after 1992, but the observation ended at the end of 1995 
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owing to unavailable or missing data for several years between 1995 and 2001. Hence, subsidiaries entering foreign 
markets after 1992 were not sufficiently considered in this study. Second, this study focused on a labor-intensive 
industry, but future studies may examine yet-to-be types of industries facing different environmental constraints in 
host countries. Moreover, Korean textile firms have already experienced the maturity stage of their industry life 
cycle and subsequently entered the restructuring phase in their home country. In other words, Korean textile firms 
entered foreign countries based on the strong necessity of extending their declining domestic opportunities into 
international markets. Future studies can apply industries with different industry life cycle. Third, although this 
study admits that general experience in other countries may have an influence on outward FDI, it did not consider 
general experience gained from other countries in the model. Fourth, this study used only PRS scores as proxies for 
government corruption because they were available for the observation period, but other corruption indexes (e.g., the 
Global Competitive Report, the World Development Report) and subjective measures could be used to complement 
our one-dimensional factor. Fifth, FDI decisions can also be influenced by firm-specific characteristics such as 
innovation intensity, R&D intensity, and entry timing, and the generally competitive dynamic environment in a host 
country. Although the importance of these factors is recognized, this study did not include these variables in the 
model because, unfortunately, the current sample data collected at the foreign subsidiary level do not include these 
variables. Future study could be enriched by the introduction of these variables into the model. 
 
Lastly, regarding our sample data, we have to admit that our dataset is relatively old. While working on the 
data, we found that during the period between 1996 and 2001, three Korean government-affiliated organizations 
have recorded FDI-related data in turn. In this process, unfortunately data from several years were missing. 
Moreover, Korean government-affiliated organizations recently declared not to disclose FDI data to the public after 
2007 to protect information of Korean firms. We may be able to collect data between 2002 and 2006 if we try hard. 
However, we are still missing data from 1996 to 2001 and the new dataset (from 2002 to 2006) would be useless. 
Although we admit that the dataset is relatively old, we still believe that this study can contribute to the IB literature 
by explaining the FDI activities of Korean firms in the early period on which few empirical studies have focused. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study departs from the existing work in three ways. First, it provides evidence for the recent 
organizational learning argument that the experience–FDI relationship may be curvilinear. That is, the positive 
effect of experience on FDI diminishes over time. Second, this study shows that the relationship between 
government corruption and FDI is moderated by the decreasing effect of country-specific experience in the dynamic 
context of an organizational learning process. This study puts forward a contingent model to understand the effect of 
government corruption on FDI, thereby suggesting that the bifurcated corruption–FDI conclusion should be 
cautiously reinterpreted. 
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